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ESSAYS
Controversies over the US Hegemony in the Multipolar World
Adam Gwiazda
Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, American hegemony continues to char-
acterize the international system. This hegemony has met with a considerably higher 
acceptance by other states and other actors of the international system than a world 
of competing superpowers and political blocs. The main argument developed in 
this paper is that American primacy may not last forever, but as there is no effective 
global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of extremist religious 
and political movements, the United States will continue to play the unique role of 
a sole superpower in the international system for a few decades to come.
Keywords: US hegemony, multipolar world, NATO, US power, military 
expenditures
Introduction
Since the end of the second World War the United States remains the most eco-
nomically, politically and military competitive nation in the world. The economic 
crisis of 2008, especially the recent problems in the US housing market, charac-
terized with the fl ood of defaults on so-called subprime mortgages, and dramatic 
fall in the in the savings rate and the rise in the trade defi cit, raised warning fl ags 
among the world’s analysts on the overall health of the US economy, as well as its 
impacts globally (Friedman 2009: 20–21). However the United States is still one of 
the most competitive economies in the world due to the effi ciency of the country’s 
markets, the sophistication of its business community, the impressive capacity for 
technological innovation that exists within a fi rst-rate system of universities and 
research centers all contribute to making the United States a highly competitive 
economy (Wagner 2008: 8).
The American competitiveness and power is even more visible in the political and 
military sphere. The second half of the XX century and the fi rst decade of the XXI 
century can be described as the “American century” which, in the opinions of some 
experts, is ending. Such prediction of the America’s decline as the strongest world’s 
superpower has been common every ten years. For example in the late 1950s and at 
the beginning of the 1960s there was the so called Sputnik Shocks “missile gap” and 
in the 1970s both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger predicted a world of fi ve, rather 
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than two, global powers (i.e. the USA and the Soviet Union). On the other hand in the 
late 1980s Paul Kennedy predicted the ruin of the United States, driven by overex-
tension abroad and profl igacy at home. The United States was at that time at risk of 
“imperial overstretch”, because of “the sum total of the United States’ global interests 
and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them all 
simultaneously” (Joffe 2009: 21, see also Kennedy 1987: 34–35). Such forecasts have 
not proved true, at least till the end of the fi rst decade of the XXI century, i.e. the period 
of the longest economic and political expansion of the US in history, which, apart from 
eight down months in 2001, continued until 2009. Already in the 1990s, after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, declinism in America took a break and the United States has become 
a sole global hegemon being able to provide public goods such as peace and security 
also to other countries and regions of the contemporary world (Hunt 2009: 12–14).
The main arguments developed in this paper is that American hegemony contin-
ues to characterize the international system in the few next decades of this century 
despite the competition from the side of regional powers, such as China, India, 
Russia, Brazil and other nations. Those emerging superpowers will rise in the next 
20–30 years to challenge US status as a sole superpower, but not to such extent to 
be able to change the existing world order.
Aspects of the US hegemony
The infl uence and power of the United States may decline in the next decades but 
this will not be a decline in economic, political, or military strength. Rather than 
the United States enjoying the role of the world’s lone superpower, the infl uence 
of other countries such as China and India will increase in relative terms. It seems 
rather unprobable that China will dominate and reshape the global system (Jacques 
2009)1. To become a global hegemon China’s has to increase not only its economic 
and military power vis-a-vis United States but fi rst of all to build a system of in-
stitutions that other countries would be willing to join and to create such alliance 
like NATO as well as to liberalize its political system. As Zbigniew Brzesinski has 
observed “NATO,s real power derives from the fact that it combines the United 
States military capabilities and economic power with Europe, s collective political 
and economic weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces)” 
(Brzezinski 2009: 10). The fact is that the United States’ liberal orientation has 
facilitated its leadership and has enabled that country to become a global “pole” 
in the present still “unipolar” world. And the United States currently possesses the 
economic and military might, which enable that superpower to exert the decisive 
infl uence on the world’s affairs and maintain its primary by default that is for the 
1 Jacques claims that China’s impact on the world will be at least as great as than of the United 
States over the best century, if not far greater, see Jacques 2009: 18–21.
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lack of serious competitors. The basic issue is the question when the balance of glo-
bal power is bound to shift and whether the gradual decline in the US superpower 
status in the world fi nancial system will change signifi cantly the gap between the 
US and its rivals. That gap in economic, technological or military fi elds is still so 
large that American’s global hegemony will still last for the few, next decades.
Under the present still centralized world system in which the United States is the big-
gest and the most infl uence pole, there seems to be no much room for the creation of 
the multipolar world system. If we take as a measure of economic power the value of 
GDP (in nominal terms) and as a measure of military power the spending for defence 
(military expenditures) both in absolute terms, i.e. dollars and as a % of GDP so it 
becomes evident that there is no such a country in the world which has at least the eco-
nomic and military capabilities of the United States (see table 1). It should be pointed 
out that if is very diffi cult to present a precise calculation of military spending both 
for the United States and China. In the United States for instance the Pentagon budget 
does not include most of the spending on nuclear weapons, which fails under the De-
partment of Energy budget.There are also the supplemental spending bills for the wars 
in Iraq and Afganistan. On the other hand interpreting China,s military expenditure 
has been a complicated issue.Although China publishes its offi cial defence budget and 
provides justifi cations for increases in its military spending, most observers remain 
skeptical of the accuracy of the offi cial fi gures (Chen – Feffer 2009: 47–67).
Table 1: GDP and military expenditures in 2007
Ranking Country GDP trillion US dollars
1
2
3
4
5
USA
Japan
Germany
China
United Kingdom
13,8
4,3
3,3
3,
2,8
Ranking Country Military expenditures in billion US dollars
1
2
3
4
5
USA
United Kingdom
China
France
Japan
547*
59,7
58,3
53,6
43,6
*Excluding about 130 billion dollars spent in that year for the military operations in Iraq and 
Afganistan
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2008, Stockholm 2008.
The comparison of the fi gures presented in table 1 confi rms the American pri-
macy both in the economic and military spheres. As regards the value of GDP, so 
in 2007 only Japan was the biggest competitors to the United States and the total 
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GDP of all four countries included in that table was at the level of 13,6 trillion of 
dollars as compared to the US 13,8 trillion. For comparison the combined GDP of 
all 27 member-countries of the European Union was in 2007 at the level of 16,9 
trillion dollars. However it is not relevant comparison vis-a-vis the United States 
as the European Union does not act on the international arena as a unit and the 
member-countries have conducted till the December 2009 their own, independent 
foreign policies on most issues (Smith 2004: 8–9).
The US primacy in the military sphere continues to grow. The fact is that the US 
spends almost ten times as much on its military as its closest spending competitor, 
the United Kingdom. Moreover, the second through fi fth ranked spenders com-
bined do not reach half the US fi gure. It should be interesting to compare the US 
annual defence spending during the Korean war, when it was 126,6 billion dollars 
(in 2009 dollars) and in the fi scal year 1955 annual spending was 221,7 billion dol-
lars. And in fi scal year 1960, at the administration’s end, spending stood at $ 265 
billion (Krepinevich 2009: 150). Since that time the US has increased its military 
spending very signifi cantly to the present level of roughly 700 billion dollars (only 
in the fi rst decade of XXI century defence spending has increased more than 45 per-
cent). It was the price for being the guarantor of the international system in which 
the United States cannot afford to cut its defence spending. The United States has 
also to act in such ways in order to preserve its power position and interests all over 
world. This involves the using o both “soft” and “hard” power as well as engage-
ment in multileralism.2 As regards the soft power, so during the fi nancial crash and 
already under George Bush administration that kind of power has eroded greatly. It 
doesn’t mean however that since that time the world has been becoming multipolar. 
The United States still conducts its mostly unilateral foreign policy using both soft 
and hard power and resolving certain international problem through “coalitions” 
with some NATO member countries. On the other hand the United States is enough 
powerful economically, technologically and militarily to be able not only to defend 
itself and its national interests but also to maintain peace in other regions of the 
world. It not only spends on defence much more than other regional 4 superpowers 
but expands its military potential. For comparison, in 2008 China had 2,2 million 
soldiers versus 1,6 million soldiers in the US but that last country possesses much 
more tanks, fi ghter planes, aircraft carriers, submarines with nuclear power and 
destroyers) than China and other regional powers.
2 Soft Power is the ability to obtain what a given state wants through cooperation and attraction.
On the other hand „hard power” is the use of coercion (military Power) and payment.The term of 
soft Power was coined by Joseph Nye in a book: Bound to lead:The Changing nature of American 
Power, Harvard 1990 and elaboratem in detail in his 2004 book: Soft power.The means to success 
in world politics, New York 2004. See also T.L.Ilgen ed., Hard Power, soft power and the future 
of transantlantic relations, Aldershot 2006: 7–8.
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Table 2: Comparison of military force of China and the United States
China USA
2,2 million
6700
1630
9
0
29
Soldiers
Tanks
Fighter planes
Submarines with nuclear power
Aircraft carriers
Destroyers
1,6 million
8000
3900
75
11
52
Source: CIA The World Factbook, Langley 2009, http://www.cia.gov/library/publication/the-world-
factbook/index.html.
The military power of the US is therefore unquestionable as well as its economic 
power. The weakest, third type of the US power is ideological cultural “soft power” 
which has been eroding since the last several years and led to rise of anti-Ameri-
canism in many countries. Such anti-American attitudes are often indentifi ed with 
antiglobalization movements. However in recent times anti-Americanism is also 
viewed as the most visible form of expression of disapprovement of the US he-
gemony and its unilateral foreign policy. In other words if one can disapprove of the 
United States for what it is or for what it does, so the former is anti-Americanism 
but the later is not. As Jeffrey S.Kopstein pointed out in practice the line is not so 
easy to draw. Some people fi nd fault with the United States no matter what it does. 
It is bad for intervening militarily to stop genocide in Kosovo but equally bad for 
failing to intervene to stop genocide in Rwanda. It was wrong to promote free trade 
and globalization in the 1990s but equally wrong for raising tariffs to protect its in-
dustries, as it did in the fi rst years of the Bush administration (Kopstein 2009: 368; 
see also Markovits 2007; Katzenstein – Keohane eds. 2007). Anti-Americanism has 
been on rise especially in Europe, where – as A.S.Markovits remarks – “is unify-
ing West Europeans more than any other political emotion – with the exception of 
hostility to Israel. In today’s Western Europe, these two closely related antipathies 
and resentments are now considered proper etiquette. They are present in polite 
company and acceptable in the discourse of the political classes” (Markovits 2007: 
1). Is should be added that American support for Israel has also made the United 
States a target for the hatred of Muslim extremists and brought about an increase in 
anti-Americanism in the majority of Arab countries. There is also well known fact, 
that George W.Bush unilateral foreign policy and the wars in Iraq and Afganistan 
fueled anti-Americanism not only among European and Arab political elites but also 
among Europe’s masses end among citizens of many Arab countries. The question 
remains open whether and to what extent anti-Americanism diminishes America’s 
soft power. It seems however, that anti-Americanism will lead to important foreign 
policy changes not only of the present administration of Barack Obama, but also of 
other, both democratic and republican administrations. It is also almost certain that 
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the United States’s military power will face few direct challenges in the near future 
mostly from the side of terrorists and other nonstate actors. Such challenges will not, 
however, change profoundly the existing unipolar world and will not transform it 
into a multipolar world. The sole erosion of the American soft power will not make 
the world multipolar, especially that the November 2008 election of Barack Obama 
as American’s 44th president has to some extent provided an antidote to the erosion 
of the American image that took place during the Bush presidency3. Despite the fact 
that the perception of US power has suffered from George W. Bush policy failures 
in Iraq and Afganistan, and the global fi nancial crisis, American primacy in the con-
temporary world is still undisputable. However many politicians believe that we are 
in a multipolar world today, where there are at least three, centres of power, though 
not equal ones, i.e. the United States, China and the European Union. Some authors 
recently argued that the current international system is nonpower, in which American 
unipolarity has been replaced by the diffusion of power to a variety of actors: regional 
powers, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multina-
tional corporations. Richard Haass argues that the US’ large lead in defence spending 
is not the best way to make sense of the international system because expenditure is 
not the same as infl uence (Haass 2008: 7–8). However all regional powers, interna-
tional organization non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations 
are not able to solve any serious global problem without the help of the US. It doesn’t 
refer only to military confl icts, but also to many other global problems. As the recent 
fi nancial crisis confi rms, many multinational corporations were not able to survive 
it without the massive state support. And no regional power such as China, India or 
Russia could be able – like the United States – to use military force on a global scale 
now and in the near future. As some authors rightly point out that “While Russia and 
China may use force regionally, they are not capable of global reach at present. This 
means that while Russia, China, and others will have to ask themselves whether the 
US will intervene when they use force, the US is unlikely to have the same concern 
when acting outside of potential rivals’ spheres (e.g., Iran). Second, if the United 
States does not act to solve a challenging global problem, it is unlikely that the prob-
lem will be solved. Conversely, if the US is committed to solving a global problem, 
its resources will make a solution more likely. For example, most agree that a solu-
tion to the global climate crisis will be much more likely if the US becomes actively 
engaged in seeking a solution” (Davidson – Menotti 2009: 19).
There is also the problem of changing balance of power due to the globaliza-
tion which cannot be identitted only with economic and political interdependence 
3 After one year many decisions of President Barack Obama have been sharply criticized and the 
image of Democratic Party in the US and the image of America abroad is to fade again. Cf. 
B. Niedziski 2009: 10; see also J. Klein 2009: 20–22.
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but rather with the set of various phenomena that derive from market forces and 
which create pressures that are felt by all states, although not to the same extent and 
with the same “fi nal effects” (Bonanno – Constance 2009: 7–8; see also Gwiazda 
2006: 11–18). Thus the consequences of globalization are much weaker in the case 
of such superpower like the United States in comparison with medium-seize and 
smaller countries. Globalization affects individual states in various ways and tends 
to reduce the autonomy and capacity of states. It also affects the balance of power 
between states and transnational corporations (Gwiazda 2003: 115–128; see also 
Drahokoupil 2008: 4–7). However the nation-states not mention such a superpower 
like the United States or such regional bloc like the European Union may use in the 
era of globalization their powers in order to limit their exposure to globalization 
through, for example, restricting the fl ow of goods money, data, and people across 
their borders. Also all other countries can pursue the similar policies aimed at the 
reduction of some negative effects of globalization. They have, however, much 
smaller choice of the foreign policy options and instruments, as regards the effects 
of unipolarity. The effects of unipolarity-contrary to the effects of globalization – 
that are felt by other states “are not so much a direct function of the distribution of 
power, as with (arguably) bipolarity, but rather the doctrinal foreign policy choices 
of the United States” (Kirshner 2008: 365). Due to the extensive engagement of the 
United States both in the world economy and in world politics it may be assumed 
that the United States remains not only more powerful than any other state has ever 
been but will also be confronted with greater political opposition from the side of 
the emerging regional superpowers. The United States has to face also an increas-
ing competition in the fi eld of economy, in which such countries like China are 
successfuly competing with other countries on the global scale.
Challenges to the US hegemony
It has been clear for years, since the beginning of the 1990s when the United States 
has become the world’s preeminent power that it has to defend its dominant posi-
tion and face challenges from the side of emerging powers, various terrorist groups 
and even from its allies in Europe. According to some experts it is just the European 
Union which is the only actor capable of challenging American primacy in the 
near future. For example Charles Kupchan maintained in 2002 that the European 
Union possessed the economic capability to be considered a great power. Kupchan 
acknowledged that the EU member countries had to act as one unit in international 
relations in order to serve as a rival to American power, but he noted that the EU 
member countries had increasingly been coming together politically and suggested 
that the then proposed EU constitution would cap the trend (Kupchan 2002: 21). 
However the rejection of the EU constitution by France and the Netherlands has 
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hindered the EU road to political unity, but the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 
December 2009 has created the new chances for the EU to become the serious rival 
to the US. The similar view has recently been expressed by Parag Khanna, who had 
argued that China and the European Union are joining the United States to form 
a world with three “relatively equal centers of infl uence”. Each power center has 
its own “diplomatic style”: the United States works through “coalitions”, China 
operates through “consultations” and Europe seeks “consensus”. The fate of world 
order, however, will hinge on how the next tier of states – the so-called Second 
World, or “tipping-point states” – choose to ally with or resist these three compet-
ing poles (Khanna 2008: 61–62).
On the other hand Fareed Zakaria argues in his recent book that American’s 
downscaling is the natural consequence of a transition towards an increasingly 
multi-centric world. The planet is characterized by the political, economic and so-
cial ascent of new stakeholders. He predicts that, “in the next few decades, three of 
the world’s four biggest economies will be non-Western (Japan, China and India)” 
(Zakaria 2008: 74). Thus the United States and Europe will necessarily have to 
re-think their roles. Zakaria tries to foresee not the decline of America, “but rather 
the rise of everyone else” (Zakaria 2008: 1). He roots his analysis in the forces of 
capitalism and modernization and predicts the end of the monopoly of Western 
and particulary European culture on global models of development. The coming 
decades will be marked by the challenge of building a new post-Western modernity 
(Zakaria 2008: 36–38).
This however doesn’t mean that the US hegemony decline in favour of new Asian 
superpowers. Zakaria points fi rst of all at China, which he describes as “the most 
successful development story in history” (Zakaria 2008: 89) and at India being 
the “world’s fastest growing free market democracy” (Zakaria 2008: 131). At the 
some time the believes that the United States is well-equipped to continue to be the 
dominating superpower on the international scene and will maintain its dominance 
in many strategic sectors such as defence, new technologies and research. In his 
opinion the United States should to accommodate, rather than resist, these modern-
izing states, allowing them to become “stakeholders in the new order” in exchange 
for their strategic cooperation. The fact is that the United States itself built and 
maintained its global leadership and now in order to preserve it will need to give up 
its unipolar policy, engage other great powers, and champion rules and institutions 
that are forged out of compromise and mutual adjustment.
The question still open is whether other regional superpowers will be willing to 
cooperate with the United States to create the new international order within the 
“old” structure marked by the America hegemony? It is also hard, to predict all 
effects of the extraordinary rise of China (Bergsten et al 2008: 7–12) which in 2009 
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become the largest exporter in the world surpassing Germany and its share of world 
exports jumped to almost 10% up from 3% in 1999. It should be pointed out that 
China takes an even bigger slice of American’s market. In the fi rst ten months of 
2009 American imported 15% less from China than in the same period of 2008, but 
its imports from the rest of the world fell by 33%, lifting China’s market share to 
a record 19%. So although America’s trade defi cit with China narrowed, China now 
accounts for almost half of America’s total defi cit, up from less than one-third on 
2008 (Fear of the dragon 2010: 65). China’s exports are likely to grow more slowly 
over the next decade, as demand in rich economies remains subdued but its market 
share will probably continue to creep up. Projections in the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook imply that China’s exports will account for 12% of world trade by 2014 
(IMF World Economic Outlook 2010: 4–5).
The most striking feature of China’s exports dominance is the rapid rise of the 
surpluses in the Chinese foreign trade balance. Those surpluses brought about 
China’s offi cial foreign-exchange reserve assets soaring to more than $2.5 trillion 
(including funds transferred to the recently created sovereign wealth fund) as of 
this writing from a humble $ 150 billion at the beginning of XXI century. What is 
more important for the United States is that some two-thirds of it was channeled 
directly into the US economy, and particularly into Treasury and quasi-offi cial 
bonds-making China the single largest foreign creditor to the US government. This, 
in turn, allowed American households to borrow and spend unfl aggingly for a full 
half-decade without having to worry about the impact of sharply rising external 
defi cits on dollar interest rates. China also effectively fi nanced the US consumption 
and housing boom and eventually the subprime fi nance bubble (Anderson 2009: 
25). In practice China has become one of the largest US creditors and this makes 
the US – China relations very vulnerable. The growing China’s exports dominance 
increases also hostility both in the US and Europe. Some experts argue that by 
holding down its currency (undervalued yuan compared to the US dollar) to sup-
port exports, China “drains much-needed demand away from a depressed world 
economy”. Therefore countries that are victims of Chinese mercantilism may be 
right to take protectionist action4. However “from Beijing, things look rather dif-
ferent. China’s merchandise exports have collapsed from 36% of GDP in 2007 to 
around 24% last year. China’s current-account surplus has fallen from 11% to an 
estimated 6% of GDP. In 2007 net exports accounted for almost three percentage 
points of China’s CDP growth; last year they were a drag on its growth to the tune 
of three percentage points. In other words, rather than being a drain on global de-
mand, China helped pull the world economy along during the course of last year” 
4 Such opinion was recently expressed by Paul Krugman, in the New York Times, quoted according 
to: Fear of the dragon 2010: 66.
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(Fear of the dragon, 2010: 66–67). Whatever interpretation of China’s global trade 
expansion will be adopted it seems that China’s rising share in world exports and in 
the US Treasury and quasi-offi cial bonds cannot be viewed as too serious challenge 
to the United States as well as to European countries and the world fi nancial system 
(Gwiazda 2008: 31; see also Roach 2009: 47–48).
The rapid economic growth and global expansion of China cannot also under-
mine the dominance of the US both in the fi eld of economy. The United States 
comes out ahead among major powers in terms of per capita income, with 47,000 
dollars per inhabitant. It is followed by France and Germany (both in the 44,000 
dol. range), Japan (38,000 dol.), Russia (11,000 dol.), China (2,900 dol.) and India 
(1,300 dol.) (CIA The World Factbook 2009)5. It is not clear how China could 
soon beat the United States in this regards, which has a per capita income that is 
5–7 times as large as China’s. Also in absolute terms the US GDP was in 2008 
worth 14,3 trillion dollars, i.e. three times as much as the world’s second-biggest 
economy, Japan’s and only slightly less than the economies of its four nearest com-
petitors combined – Japan, China, Germany and France. It should be noted that the 
rate growth of China’s economy dropped in 2009 by half from a historical high of 
almost 12 percent in 2007. Moreover China is so export dependent and it devotes 
only 35 percent of GDP to private consumption, compared with 60 percent in many 
Western Countries. Therefore China has to rebalance its economy away from the 
investment and export-led growth model that worked in the last years and toward 
domestic consumption. Such shift will bring about futher decline in the rate of 
growth of the GDP. But even if we assume that China’s economy grows at 7% in, co 
China’s GDP will increase from 3,3 trillion dollars in 2007 to 6,6 trillion dollars in 
2015 and to 13,2 trillion in 2025. At the same time, assuming 3,5% annual growth 
for the United States, US GDP will grow in 2025 to the level of 28 trillion dollars. 
Thus by that time China will have more than two times lower GDP than the United 
States (Santoro 2008: 19–20; see also Schmid ed. 2009: 20). In the contemporary 
world the only challenge to the dominance of the US economy is the European 
Union with its GDP of 18 trillion dollars. However the not fully integrated 27 states 
cannot be viewed as a serious strategic unit which may challenge the American 
hegemony in the next 1 or even 2 decades. As was said earlier that hegemony rests 
not only on economic but also on military power where the US is the undisputable 
leader. In 2008, it spent 607 billion dollars on its military, representing almost half 
of the world’s total military spending. The next nine states spent a total of 476 
billion dollars and the presumptive challengers to US military supremacy – China, 
India, Japan and Russia – together devoted only 219 billion to their militaries. The 
5 There are other estimates of Chinese GPP per capita of 6,0 thousand dollars, which include the 
undervahred yuan and other factors, see also Bergsten, 2008: 19; Goldstein – Lardy 2008: 23–24.
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military budget of China, the country most often “named” as the world’s next su-
perpower, is less than one-seventh of the US defense budget. Even if one includes 
among potential US adversaries the 27 states of the UE, which together spend 288 
billion dollars on defense, the United States still outweighs them all – 607 billion 
compared to 507 billion dollars (Joffe 2009: 26).
The power of a given state is not just a matter of the value of GDP or growth 
rates. All prognoses that show China surpassing the United States in 20 or 30 years 
do not include such sources of power as education and R&D as well as the set of 
ideas and values shared by all democratic states. Thus the struggle between the US 
and China in this century will be as much about belief as it is about power. The 
similar struggle has occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union when 
the Cold War was at its root a battle of ideas.At that time it has become visible 
that U.S. ideology was less in nedd of outside validation than Soviet ideology. The 
fact is that Chinese leaders have been not able to settle the looming dilemma of 
growth versus democracy and have emerged as defenders of the “old Westphalian 
system”, preferring to restore an international order in which national sovereignty 
is inviolable, whereas the Americans hope to transform political systems through 
their brand of “liberalization” and “democratization”. The biggest concern for the 
Chinese, therefore, is not invasion, but that an “American-led world will try to stop 
them from fulfi lling their ambitions and their destiny and that the denial of Chinese 
ambitions abroad could ultimately their ability to rule at home” (Bergsten 2008: 
102). On the other hand China’s rise, both militarily and economically, relies on 
the maintenance of a favourable international environment. However the lack of 
transparency regarding its spending and the direction of its military planning in the 
long run erodes confi dence that China has only peaceful intentions.
China’s recent global economic expansion, especially in such regions as Asia, 
Latin America and Africa can be viewed as a desire to shape the geopolitical envi-
ronment conducive to the Chinese interest both economic (to secure raw materials 
and markets) and political. As some experts argue “China wants more than it has”, 
while “Russia wants back what it lost. Both countries want more, but for them-
selves, not for all. Driven by selfi sh purposes, powers such as Russia and China 
cannot be what the United States was at its best in the twentieth century a state 
that pursued its own interests by also serving those of others and thus created glo-
bal demand for the benefi ts it provided” (Joffe 2009: 31; see also Gwiazda 2009: 
117–138). Contrary to Russia and China as well as to other states the United States 
has a mission in the world. Thus it would be very diffi cult to imagine Russia, India, 
China or even the European Union as guarantors of the world order in which all 
those superpowers could be accountable for action affecting global security and 
prosperity like the United States was in the last 60 years. The fact is that the United 
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States remains and will remain for some time yet the “operating system” of the 
global order, the “Windows” of international politics. It is not certain, however how 
long that operating system will work or when it will be replaced by another, more 
effective systems. What seems to be clear is the fact that outright rejection of the 
existing operating system international community and mass acceptance of a new 
one may occur at some point, but it would be a costly rejection and would most 
likely happened only after a long-term process of delegitimation and the arrival on 
the scene of an attractive alternative.
Longer path to multipolarity
The problem is that for the time being there is no such attractive alternative and 
the United States still will remain for some time “the default power” which does 
what other, regional superpower and international organizations cannot or will not 
do. Some experts doubt whether in today’s world there is “someone” who “would 
actually live in a world dominated by China, India, Japan, Russia or even Europe, 
which for all its a enormons appeal cannot take care of its own backyard” (Joffe 
2009: 35). Some others experts project the emergence in two decades bipolar inter-
national system consisting either of the US and China or the US and the European 
Union. Much depends, however, on the future more or less unilateral or multilateral 
US foreign policy and yielding power and infl uence to other superpowers and inter-
national organizations. In order to maintain a leading role in the world the United 
States should share its military, technological and economic dominance with other 
states. Instead of being the lonely superpower the United States should take up 
the role of “honest broker” in the contemporary world (Zakaria 2008: 233). That 
new role implies, however, that the United States has to defi ne its foreign policy 
priorities, restabilish a belief in multilateralism, adapt a wider range of fl exible 
solutions to many global problems including “the long war” with terrorism and 
restore its reputation it has lost during the George W. Bush presidency. Perhaps the 
future developments in the international system as well as president Barack Obama 
multilateral approach in his foreign policy will promote a new paradigm of the US 
foreign policy. This doesn’t mean the withdrawal of the United States from the 
role of the only superpower being able to shape a one-world system that serves its 
interests and the interests of its allies. As in 2007 Barack Obama said there is need 
to re-defi ne America’s role in the world rather than escape from it. Referring to the 
failure of the Iraq war, he recognized that “after thousands of lives lost and billions 
spent, many Americans may be tempted to turn inward and cede our leadership in 
world affairs. But this is a mistake we must not make. America cannot meet the 
threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America. We 
can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into submission. We must lead 
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the world, by deed and by example…” In other words “the American moment is not 
over, but it must be seized anew” (Obama 2007: 3–4; see also Farer 2009: 5–12). 
Even if there are signs that American primacy will not last forever, so there still is 
the chance of maintain one-world system under fading US hegemony that will be 
much more acceptable by other states and international community than a world 
of competing superpower and political blocs. That last world will certainly be not 
conducive to “relative” stability and peaceful “competition” of all states and other 
actors as today world, where American hegemony has been strikingly more benign 
than the dominance of other states and political blocs in the past. As long as there is 
no effective global security mechanism for coping with growing threat of extremist 
religious and political movement and some rouge states, the United States will be 
destined to play a unique role in the international system for a few decades to come.
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